6.1 The Top Ten Newspapers in the World by Circulation (World Press Trends, 2008) :

(1)          Yomiun Shimbun (Japan, in Japanese)

(2)          Asaki Shimbun (Japan, in Japanese)

(3)          Mainichi Shimbun (Japan, in Japanese)

(4)          Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan, in Japanese)

(5)          Chinichi Shimbun (Japan, in Japanese)

(6)          Bild (Germany, in German)

(7)          Reference News (China, in Chinese)

(8)          The Times of India (India, in English)

(9)          The Sun (UK, in English)

(10)People’s Daily (China, in Chinese)

6.2 The Top Ten English Language Newspapers in the World by Circulation (World Press Trends, 2008):

(1)          The Sun  (UK)

(2)          USA Today

(3)          The Daily Mail (UK)

(4)          The Mirror (UK)

(5)          Times of India

(6)          Wall Street Journal

(7)          New York Times

(8)          The Daily Telegraph (UK)

(9)          Daily Express (UK)

(10)Los Angeles Times

6.3 The Top Ten Online Newspapers in the World (Google, 2010: December):

(1)          New York Times

(2)          Washington Post

(3)          Los Angeles Times

(4)          San Jose [California] Mercury

(5)          Financial Times (London)

(6)          China Daily

(7)          Mainnichi Newspaper (Tokyo)

(8)          Suddeutch Zeiting (Munich)

(9)          The Australian (Sydney)

(10)        Clarion Digital (Buenos Aires)

6.4 The Top Ten Newspapers in the US by Numbers Published with Daily Circulation (Google, 2010: December 6):

(1)          USA Today, circulation 2,114,00 (featured like a TV scene, and widely available in hotels).

(2)          Wall Street Journal , circulation 2,100,000 (owned by Rupert Murdoch).

(3)          New York Times, circulation 1, 040,000 “All the news that’s fit to print.”

(4)          The San Jose [California] Mercury News, circulation 894,943.

(5)          The Florida Times-Union, circulation 735, 617.

(6)          Los Angeles Times, circulation 723,000.

(7)          New York Daily News, circulation 708, 773.

(8)          New York Post, circulation 704,000.

(9)          The Washington Post, circulation 665,000.

(10)        The Daily News, circulation 603,000.

6.5 Top Ten Best English Magazines in the World (Wikepedia, 2010: December)

(1)Time Magazine (news)

(2)National Geographic (nature)

(3) Playboy (entertainment)

(4)Vogue (fashion)

(5)The Lady Magazine (UK) (fashion)

(6) Sports Illustrated (sports)

(7)The New York Times Magazine (features)

(8)Rolling Stone (entertainment)

(9)Men’s Health (health)

(10)Top Gear Magazine (automobile)

6.6 The Top Ten Best-Selling Single Volume Books (excluding the Bible and text books (Wikepedia, 2010: October 4-5)

(1)          A Tale of Two Cities, Charles Dickens, English , over 200 million sold.

(2)          The Lord of the Rings, J.R.R. Tolkien, English, 150 million sold

(3)          The Hobbit, J. R. R. Tolkien, English, over 100 million sold

(4)          Dream of the Red Chamber, Cao Xueqin, Chinese, over 100 million sold

(5)          On the Three Representations, Jiang Zemin, Chinese, 100 million sold

(6)          And Then There Were None, Agatha Christi, 100 million sold

(7)          The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, C. S. Lewis, English, 85million sold

(8)          She, H. Rider Haggard, English, 83 million sold

(9)          Le Petit Prince (The Little Prince), Antoine de Sient Erupery, French, 80 million sold

(10)        The Da Vinci Code, Dan Brown, English, 80 million sold.

6.7 The New York Times Best Books of 2010 (2010: December 10)

(1) Freedom, Jonathan Franzan

(2) The New Yorker Stories, Ann Beattie

(3) Room, Emma Donoghue

(4) Selected Stories, William Trevor

(5) A Visit from the Goon Squad, Jennifer Egan

(6) Apollo’s Angels: A History of Ballet, Jennifer Homans

(7) Cleopatra: A Life, Stacy Schiff

The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer, Sidhartha Mukheyie

(9) Finishing the Hat: Collected Lyrics (1954-1981) With Attendant Comments,

Principles, Heresies, Grudges, Whines and Anecdotes, Steven Sandheim

(10)The Warmth of Other Suns The Epic Story of America’s Great Migrations, Isabel Wilkerson

6.8 Top Ten Best Sellers of 2010 (The Barnes and Noble 100, 2010: December)

(1)          Elf on the Shelf (Carol V. Aebersold)

(2)          Decision Points (George W. Bush)

(3)          Autobiography of Mark Twain (Mark Twain)

(4)          The Ugly Truth(Diary of a Wimpy Kid Series) (Jeff Kinney

(5)          Unbroken (Laura Hillenbrand)

(6)          A Tale of Two Cities and Great Expectations (Charles Dickens)

(7)          Dead or Alive (Tom Clancey)

(8)          Last Sacrifice (Vampire Academy Series # 6) (Richelle Mead)

(9)          The Confession (John Grisham)

(10)        Harry Potter (boxed set,Volumes 1-7) (K.R. Rowling)

6.9 The World’s Best Novelists (Google, 2010: December 6)

(1)Salman Rushdie (British Indian novelist)

(2)Arthur C. Clarke (British science fiction writer)

(3)Margaret Atwood (Canadian poet and novelist)

(4)Hans Christian Anderson (Danish poet and writer of children’s books)

(5)Vladimir Nabokov (Russian American novelist and short story writer)

(6)Gabriel Garcia Marquez (Columbian novelist, short story writer, film director)

(7)Michael Ondaatje (Sri Lankan Canadian novelist and poet)

(8)Miguel de Cervantes (Spanish novelist, poet, playwright)

(9)Haruki Murakami (Japanese writer and translator)

(10)Albert Camus (French Algerian author, philosopher and journalist)

6.10 The Greatest American Writers (Google, 2010)

(1)          John Steinbeck (novelist) “The voice of the people”

(2)          Ernest Hemingway (novelist)

(3)          Tennesee Williams (playwright)

(4)          Harlan Ellison (science fiction writer)

(5)          Mark Twain (novelist)

(6)          Edgar Allen Poe (poet and short story writer)

(7)          William Faulkner (novelist)

(8)          Scott Fitzgerald (novelist)

(9)          Jack London (nature novelist)

(10)        Steven King (no

When we review the many values which may have been or were considered universal at different times and in different traditions, we can see that among these major values found in the Old Testament as a pseudo history, chronicles, and poetry, for the Israelites were the sacredness of life, the covenant with God, forgiveness by God to humans and forgiveness-seeking from humans by God, as in the Psalms of David, the brotherhood of man (but often in a particularistic dimension exclusively for them as God’s chosen people), dependence upon God, and a guide for righteous living among others. Basically the Old Testament was written over 1500 years, and represented for early and modern Jews as the Torah or Law and the first of the world’s major religions of a monotheistic God. The Ten Commandments given by God to Moses has become a near universal standard of conduct, at least in the Western world. It was accepted by the Christians as a part of their sacred texts along with the New Testament and later was modified somewhat as a part of the historical development of Islam as the final revelation from God through the Qur’an. The Christians saw and still see the Israelites or Jews as their fore fathers in faith, and the Muslims saw and partially see the Jews and Christians as their predecessors in faith. All three of these major monotheistic religions are Abrahamic in tradition. The early Christian texts in the New Testament were identified as the new covenant between God and his people, but with the universalistic command “to go and teach all people.” Jesus Christ claimed that he was in himself, (sui generis) “the way, the truth and the life.” While accepting the Old Testament as the Law or Torah, he offered a new and more inclusive covenant and gave a new universal value to love God with one’s full heart, mind, and soul, and also to love his neighbor as himself. Both Jesus and St. Paul placed major attention on the three chief virtues, faith, hope, and love (charity). Both Jesus and St. Paul identified love as the most important and enduring of all virtues, and thus clearly universal in nature. Forgiveness of others’ wrong doing and mercy were central themes in his teaching. In his “Sermon on the Mount,” Jesus annunciated a series of positive values and negative contrasts to these values. The Old Testament, the New Testament, the Qur’an, and the sacred writings of the polytheistic religions and philosophies, all consider prayer, fasting, and alms giving to the poor as central to the development of a good life for all.

Hinduism, and later Buddhism, accepted the concept of a divine supernatural being, just as the Jews, Christians, and Muslims did, but added other divinities as also the Greeks and Romans accepted. The Hindus, without a definite founder or time for its initiation, accepted as universal principles four broad categories based on moksha—the search for liberation from unhappiness and a past chain of lives, and samsura—one’s involvement in the universe. These four broad categories included kharma–the central role in life of having a sense of doing right, but which had both positive and negative aspects, artha–the pursuit of material well being, kama—the pleasure of the senses, and dharma—leading a right and virtuous life. These combinations, accepted at least as near universals, all have the power in Hinduism and Buddhism to lead one ultimately to happiness or linkage with Brahman or unity with the divine spirit.

Buddhism, enriched first by Sidhartha, and later living Buddhas, articulates for “all humans” “Four Noble Truths”: life is suffering; all suffering is caused by ignorance of the nature of reality and craving for material well-being and attachment; suffering can be overcome by overcoming ignorance and attachment (which the Israeli psychologist Schalom Schwartz might call hedonism). Buddhism adopted the Hindu notion of life as cyclical. In Buddhism, the “Four Noble Truths” can lead to the “Eightfold Way:” which consists of right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right-mindedness, and right contemplation. These eight are usually divided into three categories that form the cornerstone of Buddhist faith: morality, wisdom, and samadhi, or concentration.

Confucianism, based in The Analects, provides a hierarchical system of five universal values: and proposes such concepts as ren—benevolence, kindness, filial piety, love of kind (a particularistic value), respect for authority and elders, social stability and harmony, goodness in life, courteousness in public life, diligence in relationships, and loyalty to family or superiors; jen or humaneness,  li—moral propriety through established rituals which include several of the characteristics of ren; di—moral righteousness or moral power; lian—one’s internalized dimension including face practices; and mianzi—one’s externalized images, including also face practices, or more broadly harmony or creating a harmonious society (a major goal of the current Chinese leadership, for example). While we do not necessarily see happiness as a central factor such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and the Greeks provide in their belief systems, it certainly must be a result in Confucianism in the process of being benevolent or kind, in having moral righteousness or power, and in both the internalized and externalized images which the Confucian life-world illustrates. Despite setbacks, the Confucian world view remains a dominant philosophy in societies such as China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and others. Justice (and social justice) is certainly a major value in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism and may indeed be a universal value.

For the ancient Greeks, and to an extent the ancient Romans who followed them,  their perception of universal values were truth including the ultimate truth, truth-telling, wisdom, the overcoming of ignorance, goodness, justice, idealism, reality,  happiness, forgiveness and reconciliation and the initiation of scientific rationalism. The goddess Athena represented both wisdom and physical power, strength and war—as contrasting drives. Early developments of individualism were encouraged by the Greeks whose young male citizens were taught and encouraged to be direct, to argue for their own rights and positions, to debate forcefully, as well as to be fully involved in civic life through the courts, the theatre, the arts, poetics, and sports, in contrast to young ancient Asians who were taught to respect authority and only to speak when they had obtained wisdom and their own respected position in society. The Greeks saw themselves as like the gods and goddesses whom they had created anthropomorphically to have all of their own human attributes and failures.

Noting that what is called the high medieval period (about 1,000 to 1400 AD) and the early Renaissance (about 1400-1600 AD) in the West continued to place God at the center of their universe, at the same time, it led to the creation of great European universities as early as the thirteenth century, extraordinary art and architecture, an evolving middle class, an enriched literature, dissident thought in the development of the Protestant Revolution, and global exploration. Often considered the greatest Westerner of the second millennium, Johannes Gutenberg with his printing press had a great opportunity to promote values not just as cultural, but as truly universal, with the printing of 200 Bibles over several years. As the Renaissance, or rebirth of classical knowledge, art, literature, and architecture, began in the West (Italy), and spread widely to France, Germany, and Spain, it led to the eighteenth century as the Age of Reason. John Locke pondered the concept of the social contract and civil society and later in the writings of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, and James Madison, we see life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and later private property, emerging as perceived universal rights and values in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

The 1891 French Rights of Man and of the Citizen declaration based on these ideas and certainly those of Jean Jacques Rousseau in the French Revolution in 1789: freedom, equality, and fraternity (or later called the brotherhood of man), included also universal notions of popular national sovereignty, religious tolerance, and the separation of powers as universal values and rights Other values perceived as universal in the French document included equality of all persons before the law; equitable taxation; protection against loss of property through arbitrary action by the state; freedom of religion, speech, and the press; and protection against arbitrary arrest and punishment, all which found their way into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Bill of Human Rights established by the two binding treaties in 1966 related to political and civil rights.

Milton Rokeach in his 1972 book, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change.  argues that attitudes long held the central position in the scholarship of social psychology and sociology, but that the value concept should move ahead of attitudes as social psychology’s and sociology’s central focus:

First, value seems to be a more dynamic concept since it has a strong motivational component

as well as cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Second, while attitudes and values

are both widely assumed to be determinants of social behavior, value is a determinant of attitude

as well as behavior. Third, if we further assume that a person possesses considerably fewer values

than attitudes, then the value concept provides us with a more economical analytical tool for

describing and explaining similarities and differences between persons, groups, nations, and

cultures. (Rokeach, 1972, pp. 157-158).

He notes that while attitudes seem to focus in the study of social psychology and sociology, the academic nature of values crosses many more disciplines, thereby creating the possibility for interdisciplinary scholarly collaboration. Rokeach defines attitudes, which are an organization of several beliefs focused on a specific object or situation as predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner. However, he postulates that:

Values, on the other hand, have to do with modes of conduct and end-states of existence….

Once a value is internalized it becomes consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion

for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and

situations, for justifying one’s own and others’ actions and attitudes, for morally judging

self and others, and for comparing self with others. Finally, a value is a standard employed

to influence the values, attitudes, and actions of at least some others…” (pp. 159-160). He

sees two types of values, instrumental—which may be centered around one or a small

group of beliefs, and terminal values—which suggests: “I believe that such-and-such an

end-state of existence (for example, salvation, a world at peace) is personally worth striving

for (p. 160).

Although Rokeach does not discuss human rights as values, in considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we can assume that universal human rights are like terminal values, or end-states. This view of the universalism of human rights tends to be more of a Western worldview, while the cultural specificity or particularism of such rights tends to be more of an Asian, Middle Eastern and African system.

Rokeach later suggests that in the polarity of values in terms of social relations as they relate to the criteria of desirability, different dimensions or modes of valuing may emphasize “equality or inequality; collectivity or individual interest; acceptance or rejection or authority; individual autonomy or interdependence; expressiveness or restraint (affectivity/neutrality); diffuseness or specificity; ascribed qualities or excellence of performance (ascription/achievement); particularistic relationship relationships or categorical memberships; personalized or universalistic standards; hostility or affection or indifference; dominance or submission” (1979).

Because values are learned culturally, a densely filled “value space” can be represented reasonably well by four factors: “(1) the extent of acceptance of authority, (2) need-determined expression or value-determined expression or value-determined restraint (3) acceptance or rejection of egalitarianism, and (4) extent of acceptance of individualism… The communication of common appraisals eventually builds value standards, which often become widely accepted across many social and cultural boundaries…” (1979, p. 22). Arguing that in any ideal value system, Rokeach says that if pressed to extreme limits, unexpected and undesired implications and consequences may result: “Example 1: Who does not want freedom? Who does not believe in some aspects of equality of human right? But what happens if we demand instant and total freedom, or instant and total equality? Total freedom is chaos, and the end result always is a dictatorial order. Total substantive equality requires a tight system of social control” (1979, p. 43).

In this context, we must note that the universalism of human rights may in certain circumstances conflict with other views in the specific cultural or particularistic context, basically a contrast between Western and Eastern/Middle Eastern/African perspectives. This view, however, contrasts cultural specificity vs. the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as universal values, to which the document itself recommends, and to which I personally subscribe. However, I am speaking as a Westerner.

Rokeach does argue in fact, noting that one reasonable patterning of values, in addition to hierarchical (i.e. Confucian orientation) ordering which may be very imperfect, and the extensiveness of adherence to particular values, is the degree of universality of application and consistency between cultures (1979, p. 18). He sees a general movement to apply “universalistic criteria and to accept humanitarian values seems evident in public policies toward ethnic and racial minorities, poor people, the physically disabled, children, women workers, and others subject to special stresses, disabilities, and discrimination” (1979, p. 37). These are clearly areas addressed by various articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as universal values (for example, Article 2—equal rights; Article 7—equality before the law; Article 25—adequate standard of living, Article 26—education.

Munro S. Edmunson has stressed  the most difficult cultural structural or functional views to identify values. “The common denominator of all culture is its communicative process, because it is through cultural communication that values are passed on within the culture and are shared with others in other cultural settings” (1973, p. 192-196). Pope John Paul II in speaking of values says: “I will only say that it is what costs that constitutes value. It is not, in fact, possible to be truly free without an honest and profound relationship with values” (1983). K.S. Sitaram argues that in western societies, the most important value configuration emphasizes individualism while in eastern societies, the chief value concentration revolves around the concept of responsibility (1995).

Clyde Kluckhohn defines values as “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristics of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” suggesting that key words include desirable [normative], conception [values as a logical construct], and selection [ability to choose between alternatives]. Kluckhohn proposes that since all values are arrived at on an evaluative basis, often culturally fixed, the realm of value is conduct, which is culturally approved or disapproved, reinforced, supported, or challenged (1962, pp. 394-403). We could define values as something to believe in, to be devoted to, to hope in, by which to structure our morality, and something to give us rootedness within our own cultures or societies, as well as those which are universally accepted.

This might also be called an idealistic, elitist, and very broad world view, in contrast to what Kwang-Kuo Hwang calls the lifeworld or the real world in which people live, not necessarily idealistically, but in terms of reality. He believes that the worldviews of a specific cultural lifeworld opposite to the scientific microworld proposed by Western values scholars are essentially different. He proposes that cultural lifeworlds are gradually constructed by people in a given culture when they ponder on the nature of the universe and situations of human beings by “orginative” thinking in history and provides answers to four fundamental questions: “Who am I? What is my situation in life? Why do I suffer? What is my salvation” (Hwang, 2008, p. 255)? Hwang believes that the western worldview of the scientific microworld “does not answer questions about the meaning of life, which is essentially different from the worldview of our [Chinese] lifeworld” (Hwang, 2008, p. 258).

Nonetheless, though approaching values from a Western perspective, Kluckhohn sees a group’s worldview or collection of values as consisting of both normative and existential postulates, both of what should be and what actually is. He not only considers the notion of values as central to cultural study, but also of value-orientations, which he describes as a generalization of nature, of the human’s place in it, of his relation to other humans, and of what is desirable and nondesirable in relating as individuals to humans, their environment, and to their interhuman relations (1962, p. 409-411). “Essentially, this means that as humans we may have generalized preferences toward certain values potentially derived on a universalistic basis, because we are humans” (quoted in Prosser, 1978, p. 180).

Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck define value orientations as complex but definitely patterned or rank ordered principles in the human evaluative process, which include the cognitive, the affective or emotional, and the directional or motivational elements which give direction to the constant stream of human acts and thoughts as they relate to the solution of “common human” problems and occur in ranking patterns of component parts which are themselves cultural universals (1961, pp. 4-8). At the level of cultural universals, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck formulate a set of basic assumptions in considering value-orientations based on the culturally specific premise that ordered variations exist among cultures. They assume that there is a limited number of common human and universalistic problems for which “all people at all times and in all locations must find solutions” (p. 10). Clyde Kluckhohn postulated that, “it should be possible to construct the views of a given group regarding the structure of the universe, the relation of humans to the universe, both natural and supernatural, and the relations of one human to another. These views will represent the group’s own definition of the ultimate meaning of human life, including its rationalization of frustration, disappointment, and calamity” (cited in Prosser, 1978, p. 179).

Kluckhohn and Strotbeck argue that, “essentially, this means that as humans we may have generalized preferences toward certain values potentially derived on a universalistic basis because we are humans” (cited in Prosser, 1978, p. 180). They isolate five basic problems to all human groups and cultures, including the character of innate human nature (human nation orientation); humans to nature and supernature; the temporal focus of human life; the modality of activity—doing or being; and human relationships to other humans. They sum up their approach to a major research problem: (1) What is the character of innate human nature (human nature orientation)? (2) What is the relation of humans to nature and supernature (human-nature orientation)? (3) What is the temporary focus of human life (time-orientation)? (4) What is the modality of human activity (activity orientation)? (5) What is the modality of human’s relationship to others (relational orientation)? They also have posed but did not test the spatial orientation. (Prosser,1978, pp.181-182).

John C. Condon and Fathi Yousef further expand these value orientations to twenty-five. As universal values and value orientations, they include the self (including individualism/ interdependence, age, sex, and activity), the family including relational interaction, authority, positional role behavior and mobility), the society including social reciprocity, group membership, intermediaries, formality, and property), human nature (including rationality, good and evil, happiness and pleasure, and mutability) nature (including relationships of humans and nature, ways of knowing nature, structure of nature, and the concept of time), and the supernatural including the relationship of humans and the supernatural, the meaning of life, providence, and knowledge of the cosmic order) (1975, p. 60-62). Adopting the contributions of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, Edward C. Stewart compares these variables between two cultures, Filipinos and North Americans. I. Perception of the self and the individual; II. Perception of

the world; III. Motivation;  IV. Form of relations to others;  V. Form of activity  (1971). Such comparisons speak as Rokeach does to the polarity of values between the East (but including also Africa) which emphasizes particularism and the West which stresses universalism (1979), and also as Sitaram does in his comparisons between Western and Eastern values (1995).

While Hwang’s lifeworld speaks of a culture gradually determining its worldview or approaches to universal values and value orientations, H. L. Nieburg suggests that changes in values are precursors to political, social, and institutional changes, and that we can determine whether values such as truth and reality are universal or culturally specific by stripping away cultural rituals: “All of the forms of ritual behavior are parts or dimensions of culture; they are expressions, often nonverbal, of the values, attitudes theories, interpretations, potential actions, and expectations of individuals in a community” (Nieburg, 1973, pp. 3-30).

Shalom H. Schwartz quotes the psychologist Milton Rokeach (1973), the sociologist Robin M. Williams, Jr. (1968), and anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn (1951) in promoting “the centrality of the value concept” and as viewing “values as the criteria people use to evaluate actions, people (including the self) and events.” Agreeing with these theorists, Schwartz writes “I too view values as criteria people use, rather than as qualities inherent in objects” Schwartz identifies ten motivationally distinct value orientations, the goals that are identified by these values, and the dynamics of conflict and congruence among these values: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism.

He offers a unifying theory “for the field of human motivation, a way of organizing the different needs, motives, and goals proposed in other theories.” He argues that to develop a coherent theory of universal values, one must address four issues: “(1) Is there a near universal set of values differentiated by motivational content? (2) Is the set of values identified by the theory comprehensive, leaving out none of the broad values to which individuals attribute at least moderate importance: (3) Do the values have similar meanings in different groups (e.g., ethnic, national, gender, etc.), thereby justifying comparison of value priorities across groups? (4) Is there a near-universal structure of dynamic relations among values?” Schwartz in his value theory, and that of Schwartz and Bilsky, notes the following five main features of all values: (1) Values are beliefs. (2) Values are a motivational construct. (3) Values transcend specific actions and situations. (4) Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. (5)Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. The above are features of all values.

Personally, I have never considered hedonism as a universal value, but rather as a contrasting and negative drive; however as he describes hedonism “as pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself,” as a biological response, it no doubt can be considered as important as the other universal values which he identifies. Rokeach also includes gratification as a value, which should be included in broad cultural values. Additionally, I have never considered power by itself as a positive value, but also as a contrasting and negative drive: “There is a constant interplay between the drives and the values of the technological society…. [Jules] Henry notes that in our modern society, the society’s media have led us to a feverish quality of life, already suggested by de Tocqueville in the nineteenth century. Henry argues that the technological society is a driven culture, forced by drives such as expansiveness, competitiveness, individuality, and achievement” (Henry, 1963). Prejudice, for example, can be seen as the combination of power and negative stereotypes and prejudice against other groups: “At the same time, many of us who are products of such a society believe strongly in values such as gentleness, kindliness and generosity” (Henry, 1963, pp. 23-25 in Prosser, 1978, p. 28). However, as Schwartz identifies that power and achievement values focus on social esteem, which certainly is commonly considered an important universal value, he notes that he does not include happiness as a universal value: “though it is an important value that some might associate with hedonism. Happiness can be linked to all values, because people achieve it through attaining whatever outcomes they value” (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000).”

Shalom H. Schwartz’s theory of the basic values that people in all cultures recognize identifies ten motivationally distinct value orientations and specifies the dynamics of conflict and congruence among these values which were measured by his SVS test: benevolence (clearly identified in Confucianism), universalism (established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its subsequent treaties, covenants, and conventions), self-direction (also proposed by the Kluckhohns and Strotdbeck considerations of values and value orientations and identifying all persons as independent individuals worthy of dignity and respect in the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights), stimulation and, hedonism (seen in Greek, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions as potential contrasts to higher ideals), achievement and power (relating to physical versus moral power as found among the Confuianists, Greeks, and early Christians, and recognizing social esteem and dignity for all individuals), security (seen in developing the social contract, popular sovereignty, and national sovereignty), conformity (seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its call for all states and individuals to adhere to its principles), and tradition (the development over time of perceived universal values, rights, and later human rights versus culturally, philosophically, or religiously different traditions).

Schwartz notes that: “The values theory describes aspects of the human psychological structure that are fundamental, aspects presumably common to all humankind. Consequently, its propositions should apply across cultures.” This statement certainly relates to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universal values as perceived historically. There are four issues for consideration proposed by Schwartz: “(1) Is there a near universal set of values differentiated by motivational content? (2) Is the set of values identified by the theory comprehensive, leaving out none of the broad values to which individuals attribute at least moderate importance? (3) Do the values have similar meanings in different groups (e.g. ethnic, national, gender, etc.) thereby justifying comparison of value priorities across groups? (4) Is there a near universal structure of dynamic relations among values? Though it is obvious that the governments from an Eastern, Middle Eastern, and African context might disagree sharply with me as they come from a particularistic and culturally diverse framework for human rights and human values, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the subsequent treaties, covenants, and conventions demand a universalistic approach to human rights, and thus in my perception also to the even broader framework of universalistic human values.

.

While Clyde Kluckhohn, Florence Kluckhohn, and Fred Strodtbeck were not explicitly concerned in their formulation and study of universal human values and value orientations specifically with universal human rights, the connections above linking universal values and value orientations and universal human rights are at least implicit. The values and value orientations that they have accepted and studied, and those added by Condon and Yousef and others such as Geert Hofstede, Michael Harris Bond, and Shalom Schwartz later have at least implicitly offered the foundation for merging the tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the later human rights treaties, covenants, and conventions with universal values. Rokeach clearly identifies the dimensions between universalistic and particularistic dimensions of universal values and universalistic versus particularistic or culturally diverse views of human rights

Henk Vinken’s discussion about human rights coming from two different camps, universalism and particularism is very appropriate and in terms of human values, his view is supported by Shalom Schwartz’ studies of universal, regional, and culturally specific values.. We note that in principle the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets an ideal standard for all of humanity, at every time, and in every place, and for every individual in society. The subsequent UN treaties, covenants, and conventions remain in contrast to the view by Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries that certend human rights are not universal but can only be seen through the perspective of particularism or cultural diversity. A number of authors have considered the relationship between multiculturalism, cultural diversity, (leaning toward particularism), and global communication (leaning toward universalism) in Sitaram and Prosser (1998 &1999).

References

Condon, J.C., & Yousef, F. (1975). An introduction to intercultural communication. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill.

Edmunson, M. S. (193). The anthropology of values. In W.S. Taylor, J. L. Fischer, & E. Z. VogtIn (Eds.), Culture and life: Essays in memory of Clyde Kluckhohn. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Friere, P. (1992). Address. SIETAR International Congress. Montegro Bay, Jamaica.

Henry, J. (1963). Culture against man. Middlesex, England: Penquin.

Hwang, K.-K. (2007). The development of indigenous social psychology in Confucian society. In S. J. Kulich & M.H. Prosser (Eds.), Intercultural perspectives on Chinese communication. Shanghai, China: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press.

Kluckhohn, R. (Ed). (1962). Culture and behavior: Collected essays of Clyde Kluckhohn. New York, NY: Free Press.

Kluckhohn, C., Rockwood Kluckhohn, F.,& Strodbeck, F. (1961).  Variations of value orientations. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.

Nieburg, H. L. (1973). Culture storm: Politics and the ritual order. New York, NY: St. Martins.

Prosser, M.H. (1978). The Cultural Dialogue. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Rokeach, M. (1972). Beliefs, attitudes and values: A theory of organization and change. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.

Rokeach, M. (Ed.). (1979). Understanding human values: Individual and societal. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? In S. J. Kulich & M. H. Prosser (Eds.) (2012).Values frameworks at the theoretical core of culture, Intercultural research, Vol. 4. Shanghai, China: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press.

Schwartz, S. H. (2012). Basic human values: Their content and structure across cultures, in S. J. Kulich & M. H. Prosser (Eds.), Values frameworks at the theoretical core of culture, Intercultural research, Vol. 4. Shanghai, China: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press

Sitaram, K. S. (1995). Communication and culture: A world view. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.

Sitaram, K. S., & Prosser, M. H. (Eds.). (1998). Civic discourse: Multiculturalism, cultural diversity, and global communication. Westport, CT: Ablex.

Vinken, H. (2012). The cultural fit of global values surveys in East Asia: The urgency to include East Asian-origin concepts. In S. J. Kulich & M. H. Prosser (Eds.), Values frameworks at the theoretical core of culture, Intercultural research, Vol. 4. Shanghai, China: Shanghai Foreign Language

May  6, 2012

NYU Dean to Devote His

Sabbatical to Expanding U. of

the People

Lisa Ackerman

Dalton Conley

Enlarge Image

Lisa Ackerman

Dalton Conley

How Universities Can Shape Global Identities

May 9, 2012, 8:23 pm

By David Wheeler

Griffith U., in Australia, has appealed to Gen Y students and highlighted researchers with its “Red Couch” campaign.

Bangkok — As universities move from being national institutions to international ones, they shift from managing national reputations to seeking international identities.

Reputation management may not be at the forefront of many academics’ minds, but when professors go abroad and meet colleagues who have no idea what kind of institution they come from, their interest may pick up.

In an seminar organized by The Chronicle here last month, “Positioning Your University Globally in the Asian Century,” speakers discussed how universities can create international identities.

Many countries want to build “world-class, top-ranked research universities.” But that phrase has become a cliche, as anyone who makes the rounds of international higher-education meetings knows. The reality is that only a few institutions can compete in that race. Universities are more apt to make the leap to global status with a select handful of programs.

The tension, one speaker at the seminar said, is often between being a comprehensive university locally and a niche player globally. “Riding those two horses is very tricky,” said Stephen Holmes, managing partner of the Knowledge Partnership, a research and consulting company with offices in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Singapore.

A reputation takes 10 or 20 years to build, said Mr. Holmes, and comes from focusing on two or three things that set the university apart. Having clear ambitions, he said, has another virtue: It shortens meetings. Distractions can be quickly set aside.

Universities, Mr. Holmes said, don’t market their differences, even when they are distinctive. Visitors who walk on a campus may instantly notice some of the distinctions, but university brochures and Web sites tend to be bland. Those curious about a university, says Mr. Holmes, find what makes the university unusual “at 3 a.m. in the morning on Page 73 of the Web site.”

“Most universities cast relatively weak or indistinct images,” he said. Institutions should market their programs, where the connections to students are, he said.

Douglas Christiansen, vice provost for enrollment and dean of admissions at Vanderbilt University, also advocated a student-centered approach. He said that marketing needs to be integrated with an institution’s core academic plan. In particular, he said, tracking students through their experience with an institution, from when they are considering applying up to  and including when they are alumni, can help institutions get an accurate reflection of their reputations and academic strengths. Universities should not forget to survey those students who drop out or move to other institutions, he said, to get a complete picture. Factors such as the students’ intellectual growth, graduation rates, and placement rates can fit into understanding the “student life cycle.”

Based in Australia, Griffith University has to compete in a market vastly different from that in the United States. Due to a strong economy, potential graduate students have lucrative job offers they are also considering. Meredith Jackson, director of external relations at Griffith University, told how Griffith sought to appeal to students, including international students, while at the same time broadcasting hard-fought gains in research strength. The university created a “Red Couch” campaign, with videos in which a comedian interviewed some of the university’s leading professors sitting on a red couch, mixing an appeal to Gen Y with gravitas. The university’s public recognition, Ms. Jackson said, shot up 22 percent in eight months.

Mr. Holmes said that one of the essential tactics in achieving a strong international reputation is “an almost ruthless determination not to embark on anything unless it can be done to the highest standards.” That might have served as an introduction to another speaker, Kar Yan Tam, associate provost at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, which celebrated its 20th anniversary last year. The university is the envy of many other institutions for its rapid rise in the rankings.

Mr. Tam said the institution’s success has come from focus: Selecting four core programs, sticking with those four programs, and not adding on others, no matter how tempting. When the Hong Kong government offered to help universities set up continuing education, Mr. Tam said, the university turned the offer down, a move that would probably meet with Mr. Holme’s approval.

“Deeper and narrower is key in strategy,” said Mr. Holmes. Universities “suffer from the fact that we try to be all things to all people.”

When universities try to pull themselves up in the world, they sometimes attach their brand to another prominent institution. The University of Manchester uses the Manchester United soccer team, which may not have much pull in the United States, but has a big fan base in other parts of the world. At the simplest level, this is affiliation marketing.

A few levels up in strategic thinking are some university consortia that co-brand and shape the environment that they work in. The Association of Pacific Rim Universities has 42 institutions with 110,00 faculty members, 1.7-million students, and about $50-billion in funding, said its secretary general, Christopher Tremewan. As the association sets its priorities, it is in the midst of some changing geopolitics. Many Asian-Pacific universities are growing stronger and a larger proportion of wealth and population now sits in Asia. An Asian-Pacific strategy, said Mr. Tremewan, is also a global strategy.

“It’s a huge shift,” said Mr. Tremewan,”and I don’t think anyone has their head around it yet, including us.”

The seminar’s last lesson: In identity building, it will be hard to ignore Asia.

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2012

SIIC Fellows program New Interculturalists’ Program

Learn more about MAIR

Join the ICI mailing list

Intercultural Communication Institute

Register online for SIIC 2012!

Dear Friends of the Institute,

We are so pleased to share with you the Summer Institute 2012 schedule. Allow us to tempt you to visit Oregon this summer!                          We have developed 16 new workshops, including one-day, three-day, and five-day programs, and engaged nine new faculty to offer the latest perspectives, resources, and approaches to intercultural education, training, research, and management.                          Our complete brochure is available at here and the workshops listed below are linked to the course description on your website. Take a quick preview of this year’s SIIC, and think about spending sometime in Portland this year!

We hope you can join us this year!             Your Friends at ICI

2012 Schedule

[*Indicates new workshop for 2012. Please note: Only one workshop may be taken per session.]

SESSION I: 3-day Concurrent Workshops: July 11-13, 2012

1a. Foundations of Intercultural Communication Santalynda                  Marrero, Andy Reynolds

1b. Foundations of Intercultural Communication Margaret Pusch,                 Jaime Wurzel

2. Teaching Intercultural Issues Online Judith Martin, Mary         Meares

3. Methods of Intercultural Training Barbara Kappler

4. Assessing Intercultural Competence Michael Stevens

5. Foundations of Intercultural Coaching T. Glen Sebera

*6. Making Your Marketing Work: An Intercultural Perspective                Cate Brubaker, Candice Hughes, Ann Marie Lei

*7. Global Sustainability Across Cultures Peter Fordos,                Cecilia Utne

8. Borders, Boundaries, Belonging, and Beyond Prany                Sananikone, Dorothy Sermol

*9. Redefining Diversity: Integrating Culture into Diversity and                 Inclusion Carlos Cortés

*10. Preparing Leaders to Engage Global Diversity: Practical                 Strategies Louise Wilkinson

*11. Defining, Developing, and Diffusing Difficult Dialogues Anita                 Rowe, Donna Stringer

12. Visual Literacy: The Meaning of Images in a Multicultural                  World John Condon, Miguel Gandert

13. China: Encountering the Culture of a Rising Power George                    Renwick

A SAMPLE OF SIIC: 1-day Workshops: Saturday, July 14, 2012

A. Engaging Generation Differences:

A Global Perspective April Lewis, Carol  French

B. Dealing with Privilege: Thinking Clearly

and Acting Effectively Carlos Cortés

C. Turning Heat to Light: Facilitating

Challenging and Heated Group Interactions Stephen                             Schuitevoerder

D. Internet Resources for Interculturalists Ted Dale

E. Why Reentry Matters: Critical Lessons and Practical Advice       Bruce La Brack

F. What Is My Homeland Now? Refugee

and Immigrant Experience in the U.S. Tanya Mead

G. Working with Disabilities Developmentally Steve Hanamura

H. Personal Leadership: Turning Our Knowledge into     Competency Barbara Schaetti

I. Intercultural Career Planning Mary Meares

J. Training Methods for Exploring Identity Tatyana Fertelmeyster K. Culturally Appropriate Instructional Design Andrea Edmundson

SESSION II: 5-day Concurrent Workshops: July 16-20, 2012

14. Cross-Cultural Training in International Corporations Ann                  Marie Lei, George Renwick

*15. Intercultural Change Agentry Todd Conklin

16. The Assessment, Development, and Nurturing of Global                   Leaders: Insights from the Field

Mark Mendenhall, Joyce Osland

*17. Developing Collaboration in Virtual Teams Terence Brake

18. Diversity as Culture Change: A Strategic Approach Anita                 Rowe, Donna Stringer

19. Training Design for Intercultural Learning Janet Bennett,                 Michael Paige

*20. Facilitating Intercultural Competence: Experiential Methods                 and Tool Basma Ibrahim DeVries, Tatyana Fertelmeyster

*21. Developmental Intercultural Competence: An Integrated                   Practice Dianne Hofner Saphiere, Barbara Schaetti

22. Training for Insight: A Learner-Centered Approach to                 International Education Adriana Medina-López-Portilla,                MickVande Berg

23. Facilitating Intercultural Discovery John Condon, Nagesh Rao

24. Linking Social Justice and Intercultural Communication in                 the Global Context Amer Ahmed, Kathryn Sorrells

25. Understanding Racial and Cultural Identity in America  William Cross, Terrell Jones

26. Emotional Intelligence and Diversity Jorge Cherbosque, Lee                Gardenswartz

27. Resolving Conflict Across the Cultural Divide Mitch Hammer

WEEKEND OPPORTUNITIES: 1-day and 2-day Workshops:              July 21-22, 2012

Designing Quality Assessment Strategies Darla Deardorff July 22

Cultural Detective Facilitor Certification July 21-22

Kozai Global Competencies Inventory (GCI) Qualifying Seminar July 21-22

SESSION III a: 5-day Concurrent Workshops: July 23-27, 2012

28. Teaching Intercultural Communication Leeva Chung, Stella                Ting-Toomey

29. Training for Intercultural Transitions: A Holistic Perspective    Lilli Engle, Mick Vande Berg

30. Transformative Training: Design, Development, and Delivery  Janet Bennett, Nagesh Rao

31. The Undercover Interculturalist: Exploring Cultural               Complexity in Everyday Experience  John Condon, Richard Harris

*32. Designing and Implementing Global Diversity Training  Dianne Hofner Saphiere, Jonamay Lambert

*33. Strategic Planning for Campus Diversity  Art Costantino, Terrell Jones

34. Facilitating Structured Dialogue in Intercultural Conflict   Benjamin Broome

35. Advanced Workshop: Coaching Global Executives George                Renwick

SESSION III b: 3-day Concurrent Workshops: July 23-25, 2012

36. Creating a Workplace That Works: When Is Something                 Cultural Going On? Tom Kochman, Jean Mavrelis

37. Intercultural Competence on Campus: Educating Global-   Ready Graduates Darla Deardorff

38. Doing the Right Thing! Values Around the World Donna                 Stringer

39. Sexuality, Gender, and Culture: An Intercultural Approach     Kathryn Sorrells

*40. Designing Intercultural Interventions: The Lens of                 Developmental Frameworks Doug Stuart

41. Interculturalizing the College Classroom: Design for                  Development Mark Harden

SIIC FELLOWS PROGRAM: July 4-21, 2012

NEW INTERCULTURALISTS PROGRAM: July 8-15, 2012

MAIR Applications accepted year round              July 2012 residency June 29 – July 14 (Reed College)

Smart Phone            users please scan            and bookmark

Intercultural Communication Institute 8835 SW Canyon Lane, Suite 238 Portland OR 97225 USA Phone: (503) 297-4622 Fax:  (503) 297-4695 Skype:  ici_office Twitter: InterSIICtions Email: ici@intercultural.org Web: intercultural.org

_____________________________________________

422 pages; Introduction: Part I: Intuitions Come First, Strategic Reasoning Second (four chapters); Part II There’s More to Morality than Harm and Fairness (four chapters); Part III: Morality Binds and Blinds (four chapters); Conclusion; Acknowledgements, Notes (323-376); References (377-406); Index.

“Haidt’s research has revolutionized the field of moral psychology. This elegantly written book has far-reaching implications for anyone interested in politics, religion, or the many controversies that divide modern societies. If you want to know why you hold your moral beliefs and why many people disagree with you, read this book.” Simon-Baron-Cohen, Cambridge University, author of The Science of  Evil. (Back jacket cover)

“Jonathan Haidt is one of the smartest and most creative psychologists alive, and his newest book is a tour de force—a brave, brilliant, and eloquent exploration of the most important issues of our time. It will challenge the way you think about liberals and conservatives, atheism and religion, good and evil. This is the book that everyone will be talking about.” Paul Bloom, Yale University, author of  How Pleasure Works. (Back jacket cover)

_____________________________________________________________________________________

“Los Angeles and Rodney King 20 Years Later: Both Better, Not Perfect, But Better”

By Madison Gray,Time, Apr. 27, 2012

[In an article about Rodney King , his beating in Los Angeles by four policemen, and their acquittal by a jury, King, the author of The Riot Within, Gray notes that twenty years after the last riots in Los Angeles, where fifty-three persons were killed and more than 7,000 buildings were torched, there is a much greater recognition that the racial situation there has greatly improved. Gray writes]

“King, is one of the people who feels this way, even though he has long since left Los Angeles proper to settle in Rialto, 50 miles away from the epicenter of the [1992] riot. To his famous question, “Can we all get along?” he now feels there is a positive answer. “There was a lot of good that came out of it, in that era it didn’t feel like it because you’re living it,” he chuckles lightly, even noting that having a black president may have been indirectly made possible by what happened. “I can’t tell you what the future holds,” he says. “I can tell you how I would like it: to be peaceful and everyone getting along. Hopefully I can leave something positive here and make it better for the next generation, that’s what it’s all about.”

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Jonathan Haidt (an undergraduate philosophy major, and then graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, followed by a post doctorate at the University of Chicago, is now a social and moral psychologist at the University of Virginia. He begins his book with the quote by King, “Can we all get along?”  He claims that while the statement by King is now seriously overused and has become a cliche, there were two reasons why he starts the book with this quote: “The first is because most Americans nowadays are asking King’s question not about race relations but about political relations and the collapse of cooperation across party lines….The second reason I decided to open the book with an overused phrase is because King followed it up with something lovely, something rarely quoted. As he stumbled through his television interview, fighting back tears and often repeating himself, he found these words: ‘Please, we can get along here. I mean, we’re all stuck here for a while. Let’s try to work it out.’”  Haidt repeats the expression: “This book is about why it’s so hard for us to get along. We are indeed all stuck here for a while, so let’s at least do what we can to understand why we are so easily divided into hostile groups each one certain of its righteousness ( xii). He  ends his book  as well: “We’re all stuck here for a while, so let’s try to work it out” (318).

Haidt, a social psychologist, calls his highly autobiographical  (my author preference labeling0 and complex  challenging book about moral psychology a reasonably new term in the field of psychology: “In 1987, moral psychology was a part of developmental [rationalist]psychology [Jean Piaget, Harold Kolhberg]. Researchers focused on questions such as how children develop in their thinking about rules, especially rules of fairness. The big question behind this research was: How do children come to know right from wrong?? Where does morality come from? There are two obvious answers to this question: nature or nurture If you pick nature, then you’re a nativist [Charles Darwin]….But if you believe that moral knowledge comes from nurture, then you are an empiricist [John Locke]” (5).

The field of psychology  whose American father was William James, is very broad, including moral (David Hume and Lawrence Kohlberg); cultural (Alan Fiske); developmental  [Erik Erikson]; evolutionary; political; and social ( Solomon Asch, Leon Festinger, and Kurt Levin) psychology which he discusses in the book. Additionally, among psychological branches which he either does not discuss or does so very briefly, we have the following examples:  abnormal (Sigmund Freud); analytical (Carl Jung); applied (Hugo Munsterberg); behavioral( Ivan Pavlov and B.F. Skinner); biopsychological; clinical (Freud); cognitive (Albert Bandura); counseling; cross-cultural (Michael Harris Bond and Shalom Schwartz); educational; experimental (Wilhelm Wundt); forensic; health; human factor (Carl Rogers);individual (Alfred Adler); industrial/organizational; personality (Gordon Allport, Eric Erikson, Freud,  and Richard Shweder); school,;  sports psychology; and values (Michael Harris Bond and Shalom Schwartz).

Haidt’s linkages to the University of Pennsylvania, University of Chicago, and University of Virginia (about which he uses a number of examples, especially about the group psychology that surrounds its American football games) have apparently provided him a very strong basis for moving from his background in social psychology (where he published his dissertation research, without much success, he says), to moral psychology, in which he has made a substantial reputation for himself, particularly through this book. He writes that he chose to call his book The Righteous Mind rather than “The Moral Mind,” to convey the sense that the human mind is designed to ‘do’ morality, just as it’s designed to do language, sexuality, music, and many other things described in popular books reporting the latest scientific findings. But I chose the title The Righteous Mind to convey the sense that human nature is not just intrinsically moral, it’s also intrinsically moralistic, critical and judgmental” (xii-xiii) and that, fundamentally, as humans, we are righteous hypocrites (xvi).

Haidt offers a basic principle for each of the three parts of his book: 1. “Intuition comes first; strategic reasoning second.” Here he develops the metaphor (often actually a simile) that “the mind is divided, like a rider on an elephant [rather than a horse], and the rider’s is to servant the elephant .” Part II: His second principle of moral psychology is “that there’s more to morality than harm and fairness.” His central metaphor (simile) is that “the righteous mind is like a tongue with six taste receptors         (with the analogy of adaptive challenge, original triggers, current triggers, characteristic emotions, and relevant values    ???     In Part III, his third principle is that “morality binds and blinds” with the central metaphor that “human beings are 90% chimp and 10 percent bee….Once you see our righteous minds as primate minds with a hivish overlay, you get a whole new perspective on morality, politics, and religion” ((xiv-xv0

In Chapter One): ‘Where Does Morality Come From?”  Haidt asks several questions about actions that respondents might say are disgusting, but not morally wrong. He traces his interest in Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s earlier development of moral psychology and moral dilemmas relating to children’s emergent ability to rationalize moral questions, then Kohlberg’s former student Elliot Turiel’s technique in telling stories to children about other children who break rules and then give them a series of similar yes and no probing questions: ‘’young children don’t treat all rules the same, as Piaget and Kohlberg had supposed….they are busy sorting social information in a sophisticate way. They seem to grasp early on that rules that prevent harm are special, important, unalterable, and universal’’ (10-11). Taking a course from Alan Fiske, who had spent many years in West Africa, he and class members read ethnographies on different anthropological topics. These topics led Haidt to develop an appreciation for intercultural approaches to moral psychology, and later as researcher in Brazil and still later as a Fulbright scholar in Orissa, India, where Fiske’s former advisee Richard Shweder had done comparative field research in the area in Chicago around the University of Chicago, to develop the theme of moral psychology still further.  Haidt came to believe that Shweder’s explanation of sociocentric morality clearly resonated with his ethnographic readings in Fiske’s class, leading him to also begin writing stories to test their relationship to moral psychology and which supported Shweder’s  findings in his own research. In summarizing his first chapter, he concluded that ‘’The moral domain varies by culture….People sometimes have gut feelings about disgust and disrespect—that can drive their reasoning….Morality can’t be entirely self-constructed by children based on their growing understanding of harm….If morality doesn’t come primarily from reasoning, then that leaves some combination of innateness and social learning as the most likely candidates’’ (26).

Chapter Two: ‘’The Intuitive Dog and Its Rational Tail’’ begins by his assumption that ‘’the mind is divided into parts that sometimes conflict. To be human is to feel pulled in different directions, and to marvel—sometimes in horror—at your inability to control your own actions’’ (27). Haidt notes that Plato, David Hume, and Thomas Jefferson sought to understand the human mind, without Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution to assist them, with an emphasis on the problems that social Darwinism attacked, that ‘the richest and most successful nations , races, and individuals are the fittest’’ leading to what he argues is a fundamental logical error. A second attack against nativism emphasized that the [Locke] theory of humans being born with a blank state, and ‘’if evolution gave men and women different sets of desires  and skills, for example, that would be an obstacle to achieving gender equality in many professions’(31). Writing about the scientific attacks on sociobiologist  Edward O. Wilson who claimed that ‘’human nature constrains the range of what we can achieve when raising our children or designing new social institutions ,’’ sided with the humanist David Hume: ‘’He charged that what moral philosophers were really doing was fabricating justifications after ‘consulting the emotive centers’ of their own brains. He predicted that the study of ethics would soon be taken out of the hands of philosophers and ‘biologized,’ or made to fit with the emerging science of human nature. Such a linkage of philosophy, biology, and evolution would be an example of the ‘new synthesis’ that Wilson dreamed of’ (32). Haidt began to look outside psychology for the emotional basis of morality with the rebirth of sociobiology under a new name’ evolutionary psychology…. I had already arrived at a Jeffersonian view in which moral emotions and moral reasoning were separate processes’ (35). Conducting several early experiments  at the University of Virginia, he introduces the metaphor (simile) of the rider and the elephant, stressing the role of the emotions in moral psychology, and writing his 2005 book, The Happiness Hypothesis where he called two kinds of cognition, ‘’the rider (controlled processes, including ‘reasoning-why’) and the elephant (automatic processes, including emotion, intuition, and all forms of ‘seeing-that’)’’ (45).  Summarizing this chapter, he states: ‘’The mind is divided into parts, like a rider (controlled processes) on an elephant (automatic processes)….You can see the rider serving the elephant when people are morally dumbfounded….The social intuitionist model starts with Hume’s model and makes it more social….Therefore, if you want to change someone’s mind about a moral or political issue, talk to the elephant first’’ (49-50).

Chapter Three: ‘’Elephants Rule,’’ begins with Haidt’s discovery that he was a chronic, though not entirely purposeful, liar, at the time that he was writing about core aspects of moral psychology, relating to his principle, ‘’intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second’’ ‘’1. Brains Evaluate Instantly and Constantly,’’ 2. Social and Political Judgments Are Particularly Intuitive,’’ 3. ‘’Our Bodies Guide Our Judgments,’ 4. ‘’Psychopaths Reason but Don’t Feel,’’ 5. Babies Feel but Don’t Reason,’’ 5. ‘’Affective Reactions Are in the Right Place at the Right Time in the Brain.’’ He stresses that he has argued that ‘’the Humean model (reason is a servant) fits the facts better than the Platonic model (reason could and  should rule) or the Jeffersonian model (head and heart are co-emperors)’’ but he disagrees with Hume’s belief that reason is ‘’the slave of the passions.’’ ‘’The rider-and-elephant metaphor works well here. The rider evolved to serve the elephant, but it’s a dignified partnership, more like a lawyer serving a client than a slave serving a master’ (67). Summarizing the chapter, Haidt argues the main points that he has introduced; ‘’Brains evaluate instantly and constantly…. Social and political judgments depend heavily on quick intuitive flashes….Psychopaths reason but don’t feel…. Babies feel but don’t reason….Affective reactions are in the right place at the right time in the brain…’’ (70).

Chapter Four: ‘’Vote for Me (Here’s Why)” returns to moral philosophy through Plato’s dialogue, The Republic,where Socrates gets his listeners to agree to what a just, harmonious, and happy city looks like, then he argues that the same relationships must rule the happy person, and happy city, ‘’then reason must rule the happy person. And if reason rules,  then it cares about what is truly good, not just about the appearance of virtue’…. As is often the case in moral philosophy, arguments about what  we ought to do depend upon assumptions—often unstated—about human nature and human psychology,’’ Haidt praises Socrates’ chief foil, Glaucon,  in the dialogue: ‘’the most important principle for designing an ethical society is to make sure that everyone’s reputation is on the line all the time, so that bad behavior will always bring bad consequences. Following William James’ concept of functionalism’s usefulness for the mind, Haidt asks: ‘’What, then is the function of moral reasoning? Does it seem to have been shaped, tuned, and crafted (by natural selection) to help us find the truth, so that we can know the right way to behave and condemn those who behave wrongly? If you believe that, then you are a rationalist, like Plato, Socrates, and Kohlberg. Or does moral reasoning seem to have been shaped, tuned, and crafted to help us pursue socially strategic goals, such as guarding our reputations and convincing other people to support us, or our team, in disputes? If you believe thata, then you are a Glauconian’’ (74).  Haidt argues that we are all intuitive politicians; that we are obsessed with polls; that our in-house press secretary automatically justifies everything,  that we lie, cheat, and justify so well that we honestly believe we are honest; that reasoning  (and Google) can take you wherever you want to go; we can believe we are honest; that reasoning  (and Google) can take you wherever you want to go; we can delusions in western history: the rationalist delusion. It’s the idea that reasoning is our most noble attribute, one that makes us like the gods (for Plato) or that brings us beyond the ‘delusion’ of believing in gods (for the New Atheists’’ (88). Summarizing the chapter, Haidt argues that; ‘’We are obsessively concerned about what others think of us….Conscious reasoning functions like a press secretary….With the help of our press secretary, we are able to lie and cheat often….Reasoning can take us to almost any conclusion we want to reach….In moral and political matters we are often groupish, rather than selfish ‘’ (91).

In Part II: ‘’There’s More to Morality than Harm and Fairness,’’ Haidt’s central metaphor (simile) is: ‘’The righteous mind is like a tongue with six taste receptors.’’ Chapter Five: ‘’Beyond WEIRD [Western ,educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic] Morality,’’ notes that most psychological studies are conducted in a very small, and elite, American setting. Heidt does not discuss the extensive cross-cultural research on perceptions and  values by social psychologist Edward C. Stewart;  the Dutch sociologist Geert Hofstede’s multinational studies;  Frons Tropenaar’s international business studies; Robert Inglehart’s GLOBE Studies;  the multicultural studies by  Canadian cross-cultural psychologist, Michael Harris Bond, based in Hong Kong,; or the Israeli cross-cultural psychologist, Shalom Schwartz universal values project. Nor, does he speak much about the concept of values, and does not list the term in his index. But, in general, he is right that most psychological experiments are based in the US and perhaps other western countries. Haidt states that ‘’Most people think holistically (seeing the whole context and the relationships among parts), but WEIRD people think more analytically (detaching the focal object from its context, assigning it to a category, and then assuming that what’s true about the category is true about the object)….But when holistic thinkers in a non-WEIRD culture write about morality, we get something more like the Analects of Confucius, a collection of aphorisms and anecdotes that can’t be reduced to a simple rule’’ (96-97). We have here the comparison between the west as individualistic and the east as collectivistic, as it is certainly true that most members of the human race live in the Asian (and African) east.   proposes that three ethics are more descriptive than one: the ethic of autonomy versus the eastern ethic of community, and the ethic of divinity [which would be found in the Hindu and Muslim worlds, but largely absent in China as a largely atheistic society]. He found himself with two conflicting identities: as a liberal atheist on one hand, and with a great curiosity about the third ethic, on which he had spent very little space in his doctoral dissertation, thus leading him to a three month Fulbright in Orissa, India. [We are both Fulbrighters in developing countries: I in Swaziland in 1990-91.] His experiments in Orissa moved him towards becoming a pluralist in terms of his psychology career and allowed him to step outside the western matrix. Summarizing this chapter, he concludes: “The WEIRDer you are, the more you perceive a world full of separate objects, rather than relationships….The moral domain is unusually narrow in WEIRD cultures, where it is largely limited to the ethic of autonomy [individualism]….Moral matrices bind people together and blind them to the coherence, or even existence, of other matrices” (110).

In Chapter Six: “Taste Buds of the Righteous Mind” really begins to explore this overriding metaphor (sweet, sour, salty, bitter, and savory)  for Part II (leaving the sixth to a later chapter) and based on a food-morality comparison by Mencius, a disciple of Confucius,  where he contends that like interculturally different foods, moral judgments are also multifaceted.  Thus Haidt explores the analogy (simiie)”that the righteous mind is like a tongue with six receptors.” Haidt returns to the Enlightenment  work of David Hume, who used sensory and taste analogies,  and his concerns about the problematic  limits of reasoning when human nature is not included. As Haidt explores the concept of the founding of moral science, he discusses autism, Jeremy Bentham and “then the utilitarian grill,” Immanuel Kant and “the deontological diner,” “in psychology our goal is descriptive [not prescriptive] . We want to discover how the moral mind actually works, not how it ought to work, and that can’t be done by reasoning, math, or logic. It can be done only by observation, and observation is usually keener when informed  by empathy,” noting that western societies became more educated, industrialized, rich and democratic, the minds of intellectuals changed.  They became more analytic and less holistic” (120).  Haidt calls for “Broadening the palate,” discussing the development of moral foundations theory which would include a universal moral “taste receptors” in order to account for “cultural learning and variation.” He and colleagues proposed five foundations using the taste sensory analogy: adaptive challenge, original triggers, current triggers, characteristic emotions, and relevant virtues. Summing up the chapter, Haidt says that: “Morality is like taste in many ways….Hume’s pluralist, sentimentalist, and naturalist approach to ethics is more promising than utilitarianism or deontology for modern moral psychology…. Modularity can help us think about innate receptors, and how they produce a variety of and how they produce a variety of initial perceptions that get developed in culturally variable ways….Five good candidates for being taste receptors of the righteous mind are care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity” (127).

Haidt begins to address the book’s subtitle: “Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion,” more fully in Chapter Seven: “The Moral Foundations of Politics.” He proposes a series of five moral foundations (versus homo economicus—who would judge all actions with a price tag in mind), and arguing that scientifically it would be risky” to assert that anything about human nature was innate” with bipolar assumptions: the care-harm foundation; the fairness-cheating foundation, the loyalty-betrayal foundation, the authority-subversion foundation, and the sanctity-degradation foundation.  He summarizes his descriptors as follows: “The Care/harm foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable children….The Fairness/cheating foundation evolve in response to the adaptive challenge of reaping the rewards of cooperation without getting exploited….The Loyalty/betrayal foundation evolved in the response to the adaptive challenge of forming and maintaining coalitions….The Authority/subversion foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenging of forging relationships that will benefit us within social hierarchies….The Sanctity/degradation foundation  evolved initially in response to the adaptive challenge of the omnivore’s dilemma, and then to the broader challenge of living in a world of pathogens and parasites” (153-154).

Noting again that he was initially liberally oriented in terms of his political beliefs and identifying himself as a former speechwriter for the 2004 John Kerry presidential campaign which had many slogans that had no moral content at all, in his Chapter Eight: “The Conservative Advantage,” Haidt begins  by noting that in a talk to Charlottesville, Virginia Democrats, he articulated for them that: “Republicans understand moral psychology. Democrats don’t. Republicans have long understood that the elephant is in charge of political behavior, not the rider, and they know how elephants work…. Republicans don’t just aim to cause fear, as some Democrats charge. They trigger the full range of intuitions described  by Moral Foundations Theory” (156). Haidt, a colleague and graduate student at the University of Virginia,  created the first version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) so that they could  measure morals from a sample internet pool of 1,600 participants. They discovered that Care and Fairness were moderately high morals from liberals to conservatives, and that everyone said that concerns about compassion, cruelty, fairness, and injustice were relevant to their judgments about right and wrong. But when they tabulated the results for loyalty, authority, and sanctity, liberals largely rejected these considerations (a two-step foundation morality, but those who identified themselves as very conservative, all five concerns came together. Others also used the MFQ, and in 2007, several of the researchers met at the American Psychology Association conference. All of them agreed that they had begun initially as liberals, but they all had the same concerns about the way that the liberal field of psychologists approached political psychology: “The five of us also shared a deep concern about the polarization and incivility of American political life.” The group decided to do future studies online, and created a website (www.YourMorals.com  )  where people could register when they would first visit, and then take part in dozens of studies on moral and political psychology. By 2011, 130,000 participants had provided data which demonstrated that the graph lines for care and fairness slanted downward   while those for loyalty, authority, and sanctity slanted upward: “Liberals value Care and Fairness far more than the other three foundations; conservatives endorese all five foundations more or less equally(159-161). When Barack Obama won the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, Haidt said that: “At long last, it seemed, the Democrats had chosen a candidate with a broader moral palate, someone able to speak about all five foundations” but during the summer of 2008, his speech to a major civil rights organization, it was all about social justice and corporate greed: “It used on the Care and Fairness foundations, and fairness often meant equality of outcomes. In his famous speech in Berlin, he introduced himself as ‘a fellow citizen of the world’ and he spoke of ‘global citizenship… The Berlin speech reinforced the emerging conservative narrative that Obama was a liberal universalist, someone who could not be trusted to put the interests of his nation above the interests of the rest of the world” (163-164). In contrast, John McCain’s slogan was “Country First.”  Haidt then wrote an essay: “What Makes People Vote Republican” and he used the Moral Foundations Theory to understand the moral matrices of both sides. He contrasted the views of John Stewart Mills (“a peaceful, open, and creative place where diverse individuals respect each other’s rights and band together voluntarily”) and the French sociologist Emile Durkheim  “man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs”(165-166). Among the responses were statements of surprise that conservatives might have an alternative moral vision. While conservatives with military or religious backgrounds found his portrayal of their morality accurate and useful.  In Chapter Seven, Haidt recalls that he had discussed the Liberty/Oppression Foundation,  and he notes that “For groups that made this political transition to egalitarianism, there was a quantum leap in the development of moral matrices, or “self-domestication”: The Liberty foundation obviously operates in tension with the Authority foundation….The Liberty foundation supports the moral matrix of revolutionaries and ‘freedom fighters’ everywhere”(174).  In early 2009, the Tea Party emerged “to reshape the American political landscape and realign the American culture war.” Haidt suggests that the “Moral Foundation Theory says that there are (at least) six psychological systems that comprise the universal foundations of the world’s many moral matrices. The various moralities found on the political left tend to rest most strongly on the Care/harm and Liberty/oppression foundations” and “support ideals of social justice,” “solidarity,” “Everyone—left, right, and center—cares about Care/harm, but liberals care more….Everyone—left, right, and center—cares about Liberty/oppression, but each political faction cares in a different way. In the contemporary United States, liberals are most concerned about the rights of certain vulnerable groups (e.g., racial minorities, children, animals), and they look to government to defend the weak against oppression by the strong. Conservatives, in contrast, hold more traditional ideas of liberty as the right to be left alone, and they often resent liberal programs that use government to infringe on their liberties in order to protect the groups that liberals care most about” (181-182).Summarizing the chapter, Haidt notes that: “We added the Liberty/oppression foundation, which makes people notice and resent any sign of attempted domination….We modified the Fairness foundation to make it focus more strongly on proportionality” (185).

For Part III: “Morality Binds and Blinds,” Haidt’s central metaphor is “We are 90 Percent Chimp and 10 Percent Bee.” Chapter Nine emphasizes American tendencies toward goupishness (joining groups and  organizations) rather than selfishness (pursuit of self-interest). Individualism versus collectivism are certainly major emphases in Geert Hofstede’s six national dimensions based on his extensive multinational research, and the United States ranks very high in individualism in contrast to several other eastern societies which rank very high on collectivism.  In our 2012 intercultural communication text book for Chinese university students, Communicating Interculturally, published by Higher Education Press in Beijing, Li Mengyu and I make the following comments concerning Hofstede’s national dimension of individualism versus collectivism:

This dimension attempts to describe how people in each culture identify themselves and

others. Individualism places the greater emphasis on the individual, and “I” consciousness

prevails  in that culture. Competition rather than,,cooperation is encouraged, personal

goals and interests take precedence over group goals and interests. Hofstede (1991)

defined individualism as “societies in which ties between individuals are loose; everyone

is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family.” Therefore, in

an individualistic culture, an individual or “I” identity is regarded as the most important unit

in society, and the value of each individual is placed in the first position, often in a very

egalitarian manner. While in a collectivistic or communitarian culture, “we” consciousness

prevails over individuals, group goals and interests take precedence over personal goals and

interests. Consequently, Hofstede (1991) explained collectivism as “societies in which people

from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s

lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.” Samovar and Porter

(2004) analyzed the feature of collectivism in a similar view, “Collectivism is characterized by a

rigid social framework that distinguishes between in-group (relatives, clans, organizations) to

look after them, and in exchange for that they believe they owe absolute loyalty to the group.”

Thus, in collective cultures, the concept of “group” and “we” is of great importance; each person’s

identity is established on the social system; and the individual has a close tie with the

organizations  and institutions in which he or she belongs.

According to Hofstede, individualism and collectivism are central to all the cultural values.

According to his research, the United States, Australia, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands

and New Zealand are among those most individualism-oriented countries, while Pakistan,

Indonesia, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and Guatemala are highly collectivistically-

oriented. That is to say, individualism can be found in most northern and western areas of

Europe and North America, while collectivism can be observed in Central and South America,

the Middle East, Asia, Africa and the Pacific islands (Li & Prosser, 2012, p. 107).

While I see many signs of individualism in the United States, fortified by books such as Robert Putnam’s  2000 book Bowling Alone, and also indications that many Americans join organizations to develop social relationships, it is interesting to see Haidt’s findings on American groupishness. He admits, for example, that he also found this groupishness a puzzle, but he offers four examples of new evidence that demonstrates “the value of thinking about groups as real entities that compete with each other. This new evidence leads us directly to the third and final principle of moral psychology. Morality binds and blinds. I will suggest that human nature is mostly selfish, but with a groupish overlay that resulted from the fact that natural selection works at multiple levels simultaneously……Groups compete with groups, and that competition favors groups composed of true team players—those who are willing to cooperate and work for the good of the group even when they could do better by slacking, cheating, or leaving the group” (191-192). Haidt cites Darwin’s findings about the morality of group: “Ultimately our moral sense becomes a highly complex sentiment—originating in the social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, and confirmed by instruction and habit” (194-195). Haidt points major transitions that have occurred in evolution,  shared intentionality among humans, the evolvement of genes and cultures, and the potential swiftness of evolution. He argues that group selection does not require war or violence, which no doubt many people would challenge.  Summarizing this chapter, Haidt writes that major transitions produce superorganisms; the emergence of the uniquely human ability ot share intentions and other mental representations; genes and cultures coevolve; and evolution can be fast: “We humans have a dual nature—we are selfish  primates who long to be a part of something larger and nobler than ourselves” (219-220).

Chapter Ten: “The Hive Switch” cites William McNeill’s hypothesis that “the process of ‘muscular bonding’….enabled people to forget themselves, trust each other, function as a unit, and then crush less cohesive groups” (222).  Haidt identifies his own hypothesis for the chapter “is that human beings are conditional hive creatures. We have the ability (under special conditions) to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in something larger than ourselves. That ability is what I’m calling the hive switch…. The hive switch is an adaptation for making groups more cohesive, and therefore more successful in competition with other groups” (223).  He describes such hivish activities as collective emotions and many ways to flip the switch, and the biology of the hive switch, hives at work,  and then the nature of political hives. He concludes this chapter by stating: “Once you understand our dual nature, including our groupish overlay, you can see what happiness comes from between. We evolved to live in groups” (244).  [This leads, politically, to people joining  as team members in the efforts of one group to compete with, and defeat another group—Republicans and Democrats in the US, for example, encourage this sort of groupishness.]

Chapter Eleven: “Religion Is a Team Sport”  begins with Haidt’s description of autumn American football games at the University of Virginia, which has, Haidt argues, all of the trappings  of organized religion: “It’s a whole day of hiving and collective emotions….From a Durkheimian perspective these behaviors serve a very different function [than to encourage their team to win], and it is the same one that Durkheim saw at work in most religious rituals: the creation of a community. A college football game is a superb analogy for religion.” Durkheim sees religion as binding a community together. With the destruction of the World Trade Center twin towers on September 11, 2001, many Americans equated the nine Muslim perpretrators with Islam as fostering terrorism, and so many books were written attacking not only Islam, but other religions too (except Buddhism), that Haidt indicates a “New Atheism” like Plato’s rationalism  was born, arguing that the Supernatural or God was nothing more than a delusion. Haidt notes that the New Atheists developed the “hypersensitive agency detection device”—or the birth of a supernatural being, where none can be discovered, andseeing something there that does not exist, and as a solution is “an agency detection module” which like the detection device, operates on a hair trigger, swiftly and without necessary reasons: “According to these theorists, the genes for constructing these various modules were all in place by the time modern humans left Africa, and the genes did not change in response to selection pressures either for or against religiosity during the 50,000 years since then. The gods changed, however, and this brings us to the second step of the New Atheist story, cultural evolution.” (253). Thus, in Haidt’s perspective the religious story also evolved, creating new by-products, and “the cultural group selection. On the other hand, Emile Durkheim saw by products and then “maypoles” (rituals, belonging,  and groupism). Haidt asks whether God is a force for good or evil?: “The New Atheists assert that religion is the root of most evil. They say it is a primary cause of war, genocide, terrorism, and the oppression of women. Religious believers, for their part, often say  that atheists are immoral and that they can’t be trusted” 264-265). Finally, Haidt offers as he says, “The Definition of Morality (At Last)” which many of his readers perhaps would have preferred much earlier in the book. He defines moral systems as “interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible.” Concluding the chapter, Haidt states:  “We humans have an extraordinary ability to care about things beyond ourselves, to circle around those things with other people, and in the process to bind ourselves into teams that  can pursue larger projects. That’s what religion is all about” (273).

In the final Chapter Twelve: “Can’t We All Disagree More Constructively” (which I read first and then have returned to it again), Haidt recognizes the nastiness of politics, but asks: “Does it have to be this nasty? The country now seems polarized and embattled to the point of dysfunction. They are right. Up until a few years ago, there were some political scientists who claimed that the so-called culture war was limited to Washington…But in the last twelve years Americans have begun to move further apart….This shift to a more righteous and tribal mentality was bad enough in the 1990s, a time of peace, prosperity, and balanced budgets. But nowadays, when the fiscal and political situations are so much worse, many Americans feel that they’re on a ship that’s sinking, and the crew is too busy fighting with each other to bother plugging the leaks ” (275-276). When he discusses the evolutionary movement from  genes to moral matricses, he suggests  three steps in the process: “Step 1: Genes Make Brains; Step 2: Traits Guide Children along Different Paths;  Step 3: People Construct Life Narratives” (278-283). Among the narratives that people construct are “The Grand Narratives of Liberalism and Conservatism” giving the left a blind spot: “Moral Capital.” Reflecting on the Taoist (Daoist) concepts of yin and yang, he calls yin, in this case, “Liberal Wisdom,” leading the liberals to establish two essential points for a healthy life: “Point #1: Governments Can and Should Restrain Corporate Superorganisms,” Point #2: “Some Problems Really Can Be Solved by Regulation” (296-300). On the other hand “Yang #1: Libertarian Wisdom, ”Counterpoint #1: “Markets Are Miraculous,” “Yang #2: “Social Conservative Wisdom, “”Counterpoint #2: “You Can’t Help the Bees by Destroying the Hive” (300-309). Haidt calls upon people in each opposite to move toward more civil politics: “Human beings are the frontline in the battle; we contain both god and evil, and we must pick one side and fight for it” (309). He summarizes his arguments: “People don’t adapt their ideologies at random, or by soaking up whatever ideas are around them” and accept the life narratives either from the more liberal political developments or the more conservative ones: “Morality binds and blinds. It blinds us into ideological teams that fight each other as though the fate of the world depended on our side winning each battle. It blinds us to the fact that each team is composed of good people who have something important to say” (313).

In his brief conclusion to the book, he ends as he has begun: “We’re all stuck here for a while, so let’s try to work it out” (318).

______________________________________________________________________________

Although Haidt discusses virtues several times in the book, he rarely uses the term values and the term is not included in the book’s index. Perhaps he is equating virtues and values as having basically the same meaning.  Both of these terms would seem to play an important factor in a study of moral psychology and the moral or righteous mind. Gordon Allport, who helped to develop the “Values Scale,” was a pioneer in abnormal, individual personality, social and trait psychology in the US. His book The Nature of Prejudice in 1954 had a major influence simultaneously  in the anthropological, poltical science,  psychological, and sociological study of values, for example by Clyde Kluckhohn, Florence Rockham Kluchhohn, and Fred Strodtbeck in their  empirical studies in the 1950s, especially of the five southwestern  US communities and their development of value orientations, including human nature, humans in nature, the role of the supernatural, human relationships, time, and space (among others).

In Li Mengyu’s and my 2012 intercultural communication text for Chinese university students, Communicating Interculturally, published by Higher Education Press in Beijing, we consider the importance of  the influence of Milton Rokeach, the Polish American social psychologist on the role of values in society,

Milton Rokeach argues that attitudes long held the central position in the scholarship of social psychology and sociology, but that the value concept should move ahead of attitudes as social psychology’s and sociology’s central focus: “First, value seems to be a more dynamic concept since it has a strong motivational component as well as cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Second, while attitude and value are both widely assumed to be determinants of social behavior, value is a determinant of attitude as well as behavior. Third, if we further assume that a person possesses considerably fewer values than attitudes, then the value concept provides us with a more economical analytical tool for describing and explaining similarities and differences between persons, groups, nations, and cultures” (1972: 157-158). He notes that while attitudes seem to focus in the study of social psychology and sociology, the study of values crosses many more disciplines, thereby creating the possibility for interdisciplinary scholarly collaboration.

Rokeach defines attitudes, which are an organization of several beliefs focused on a specific object or situation as predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner. However, he postulates that: “Values, on the other hand, have to do with modes of conduct and end-states of existence…. Once a value is internalized it becomes consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one’s own and others’ actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others, and for comparing self with others. Finally, a value is a standard employed to influence the values, attitudes, and actions of at least some others…” (159-160). He sees two types of values, instrumental—which may be centered around one or a small group of beliefs, and terminal values—which suggests: “I believe that such-and-such an end-state of existence (for example, salvation, a world at peace) is personally worth striving for” (160). Although Rokeach does not discuss human rights as values, in considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we can assume that universal human rights are like terminal values, or end-states. This view of the universalism of human rights tends to be more of a Western world view, while the cultural specificity or particularism of such rights tends to be more of an Asian, Middle Eastern and African system (Li & Prosser, 2012).

Rokeach later suggests that in the polarity of values in terms of social relations as they relate to the criteria of desirability, different dimensions or modes of valuing may emphasize: “equality or inequality; collectivity or individual interest; acceptance or rejection or authority; individual autonomy or interdependence; expressiveness or restraint (affectivity/neutrality); diffuseness or specificity; ascribed qualities or excellence of performance (ascription/achievement); particularistic relationship relationships or categorical memberships; personalized or universalistic standards; hostility or affection or indifference; dominance or submission.”

Because values are learned culturally, a densely filled “value space” can be represented reasonably well by four factors: “(1) the extent of acceptance of authority, (2) need-determined expression or value-determined expression or value-determined restraint (3) acceptance or rejection of egalitarianism, and (4) extent of acceptance of individualism…. The communication of common appraisals eventually builds value standards, which often become widely accepted across many social and cultural boundaries…”(1979: 22). Arguing that in any ideal value system, Rokeach says that if pressed to extreme limits, unexpected and undesired implications and consequences may result: “Example 1: Who does not want freedom? Who does not believe in some aspects of equality of human right? But what happens if we demand instant and total freedom, or instant and total equality? Total freedom is chaos, and the end result always is a dictatorial order.  Total substantive equality requires a tight system of social control” (1979: 43) (Li & Prosser, 2012).

In this context, we must note that the universalism of human rights may in certain circumstances conflict with other views in the specific cultural or particularism context, basically a contrast between Western and Eastern/Middle Eastern/African perspectives. This view, however, contrasts cultural specificity vs. the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as universal values, to which the document itself recommends, and to which many Westerners subscribe. Rokeach does, in fact, note that one reasonable patterning of values, in addition to hierarchical ordering which may be very imperfect, and the extensiveness of adherence to particular values, is the degree of universality of application and consistency between cultures (1979:18). He sees a general movement to apply “universalistic criteria and to accept humanitarian values seems evident in public policies toward ethnic and racial minorities, poor people, the physically disabled, children, women workers, and others subject to special stresses, disabilities, and discrimination”(1979: 37). These are clearly areas addressed by various articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as universal values (for example, Article 2—equal rights; Article 7— equality before the law; Article 25—adequate standard of living, Article 26—education (Li & Prosser, 2012).

Universal Human Rights as Universal Values, Michael  H. Prosser (constituting the Summary of his essay, “Universal Human Rights as Universal Values,” in S. J. Kulich and M.H. Prosser (Eds.) (2012), Values Frameworks at the Theoretical Crossroads of Culture, Intercultural Research Series, Vol. 3 Shanghai, China: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press.)

When we review the many values which may have been or were considered universal at different times and in different traditions, we can see that among these major values found in the Old Testament as a pseudo history, chronicles, and poetry for the Israelites were the sacredness of life, the covenant with God, forgiveness by God to humans and forgiveness-seeking from humans by God, as in the Psalms of David,  the brotherhood of man (but often in a particularistic dimension exclusively for them as God’s  chosen people), dependence upon God, and a guide for righteous living among others. Basically the Old Testament was written over 1500 years, and represented for early and modern Jews as the Torah or Law and the first of the world’s major religions of a monotheistic God. The Ten Commandments given by God to Moses have become a near universal standard of conduct, at least in the Western world.  It was accepted by the Christians as a part of their sacred texts along with the New Testament and later was modified somewhat as a part of the historical development of Islam as the final revelation from God through the Qu’ran. The Christians saw and still see the Israelites or Jews as their fore fathers in faith, and the Muslims saw  and partially see the Jews and Christians as their predecessors in faith, but with the conviction that the Islamic Qur’an is the final prophetic realization given to Mohammad in the sixth century.

The early Christian texts in the New Testament were identified as the new covenant between God and his people, but with the universalistic command “to go and teach all natons.” Jesus Christ claimed that he was in himself, (sui generis) “the way, the truth and the life.” While accepting the Old Testament as the Law or Torah, he offered a new and more inclusive covenant and gave a new universal value to love God with one’s full heart, mind, and soul, and also to love his neighbor as himself. Both Jesus and St. Paul placed major attention on the three chief virtues, faith, hope, and love (charity). Jesus and St. Paul identified love as the most important and enduring of all virtues, and thus clearly universal in nature. Forgiveness of others’ wrong doing and mercy were central themes in his teaching. In his “Sermon on the Mount,” Jesus annunciated a series of positive values and negative contrasts to these values (the Beatitudes and the Woes). The Old Testament, the New Testament, the Qur’an, and the sacred writings of the polythesistic religions and philosophies, all consider prayer, fasting, and alms giving to the poor as central to the development of a good life for all.

Hinduism, and later Buddhism, accepted the concept of a divine supernatural being, just as the Jews, Christians, and Muslims did, but added other divinities as also the Greeks and Romans accepted. The Hindus, without a definite founder or time for its initiation, accepted as universal principles four broad categories based on “moksha”—the search for liberation from unhappiness and a past chain of lives, and “samsara”—one’s involvement in the universe. These four broad categories included  “kharma”–the central role in life of having a sense of doing right, but which had both positive and negative aspects,  “artha”–the pursuit of material wellbeing, “kama”—the pleasure of the senses, and “dharma”—leading a ‘right and virtuous life. These combinations, accepted at least as near universals, all have the power in Hinduism and Buddhism to lead one ultimately to happiness or linkage with Brahman or unity with the divine spirit.

Buddhism, enriched first by Sidhartha, and later living Buddhas, articulates for “all humans” “Four Noble Truths:  ”life is suffering; all suffering is caused by ignorance of the nature of reality and craving for material wellbeing and attachment; suffering can be overcome by overcoming ignorance and attachment (which Schwartz might call hedonism). Buddhism adopted the Hindu notion of life as cyclical. The “Four Noble Truths” can lead to the righteous “Eightfold Way:” which consists of right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right-mindedness, and right contemplation. These eight are usually divided into three categories that form the cornerstone of Buddhist faith: morality, wisdom, and “Samadhi”, or concentration.

Confucianism, based in The Analects, provides a hierarchical system of five universal values: and proposes such concepts as “ren”—benevolence, kindness, filial piety, love of kind (a particularistic value), respect for authority and elders, social stability and harmony, goodness in life, courteousness in public life, diligence in relationships, and loyalty to family or superiors; jen or humaneness, “ li”—moral propriety through established rituals which include several of the characteristics of “ren d”i—moral righteousness or moral power; “lian”—one’s internalized dimension including face practices; and “mianzi”—one’s externalized images, including also face practices, or more broadly harmony or creating a harmonious society (a major goal of the current Chinese leadership, for example). While we do not necessarily see happiness as a central factor such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and the Greeks provide in their belief systems, it certainly must be a result in Confucianism in the process of being benevolent or kind, in having moral righteousness or power, and in both the internalized and externalized images which the Confucian life-world illustrates. Despite setbacks, the Confucian world view remains a dominant philosophy in societies such as China, Japan, Korea, and others. Justice (and social justice) is certainly a major value in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism and may indeed be a universal value.

For the ancient Greeks, and to an extent the ancient Romans who followed them,  their perception of universal values were truth including the ultimate truth, truth-telling ,wisdom, the overcoming of

of ignorance,  goodness, justice, idealism, reality,  happiness, forgiveness and reconciliation and the initiation of scientific rationalism. The goddess Athena represented both  wisdom and physical power, strength, and war—as contrasting drives. Early developments of individualism were encouraged by the Greeks whose young male citizens were taught and encouraged to be direct, to argue for their own rights and positions, to debate forcefully, as well as to be fully involved in civic life through the courts, the theatre, the arts, poetics, and sports, in contrast to young ancient Asians who were taught to respect authority and only to speak when they had obtained wisdom and their own respected position in society. The Greeks saw themselves as like the gods and goddesses whom they had created anthropomorphically to have all of their own human attributes and failures.

Noting that what is called the high medieval period in the West continued to place God at the center of their universe; at the same time, it led to the creation of great European universities as early as the thirteenth century, extraordinary art and architecture, an evolving middle class, an enriched literature, dissident thought in the development of the Protestant Revolution, and global exploration. Often considered the greatest Westerner of the second millennium, Johannes Gutenberg, with his printing press, had a great opportunity to promote values not just as cultural, but as truly universal. As the Renaissance, or rebirth of classical knowledge, art, literature, and architecture began in the West, and spreading widely, it led to the eighteenth century  Enlightenment as the Age of Reason. In John Locke who pondered the concept of the social contract and civil society and later Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and James Madison, we see life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness emerging as universal rights and values in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

The 1891 French Rights of Man and of the Citizen declaration based on these ideas and certainly those of Jean Jacques Rousseau in the French Revolution in 1789: freedom, equality, and fraternity (or later called the brotherhood of man), included also universal notions of popular national sovereignty, religious tolerance, and the separation of  powers as universal values and rights. Other values perceived as universal  in the French document included  equality of all persons before the law; equitable taxation; protection against loss of property through arbitrary action by the state; freedom of religion, speech, and the press; and protection against arbitrary arrest and punishment, all which found their way into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Bill of Human Rights established by the two binding treaties in1966 [civil rights and political rights].

Most likely, the term human rights was first fully developed in the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, when the international slave trade was abolished as a fundamental violation of the rights of those who were enslaved. However, the actual abolishment of slavery in the West did not occur until President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. Unfortunately, although slavery has been identified more recently in United Nations treaties, documents, and declarations as a “crime against humanity,” it still exists in many societies in the world. Universal values such as peace, national sovereignty, social justice, dignity, tolerance, and, equality all have been stressed more and more in modern times and as central to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and subsequent United Nations treaties, covenants, documents, and declarations..

The Hague Conventions, the League of Nations, and the United Nations all set the stage for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and subsequent treaties, conventions, and declarations for a broad set of universalistic principles, norms, values, and ideals to be accepted, at least theoretically, on a world-wide basis. The universal search for international peace and security, as well as the rights and values noted above, in contrast to particularistic and culturally selective values and rights have been at odds in modern societies, especially in Eastern, Middle Eastern, and African contexts. Universal values are clearly linked to universal human rights in the principles of the United Nations, although often not in the practice in individual societies.

While Clyde Kluckhohn, Frances Kluckhohn, and Fred Strodtbeck were not explicitly concerned in their formulation and study of universal human values and value orientations specifically with universal human rights, the connections above linking universal values and value orientations and universal human rights are at least implicit. The values and value orientations that they have accepted and studied, and those added by Condon and Yousef (1975) and others such as Geert Hofstede, Michael Harris Bond, and Shalom Schwartz later have  at least implicitly offered the foundation for merging the tenets of the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights and the later human rights treaties, covenants, and conventions with universal values. Rokeach clearly identifies the dimensions between universalistic and particularistic dimensions of universal values and universalistic versus particularistic or culturally diverse views of human rights.

Henk Vinken’s discussion (2012) about human rights coming from two different camps, universalism and particularism is very appropriate and in terms of human values, his view is supported by Shalom Schwartz’ studies of universal, regional, and culturally specific values.  We note that in principle the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an ideal standard for all of humanity, at every time, and in every place, and for every individual in society. The subsequent UN treaties, covenants, and conventions remain in contrast to the view by Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries that certain human rights are not universal but can only be seen through the perspective of particularism or cultural diversity. A number of authors have considered the relationship between multiculturalism, cultural diversity, (leaning toward particularism), and global communication (leaning toward universalism). Shalom H. Schwartz’s theory of the basic values that people in all cultures recognize, identifies ten motivationally distinct value orientations and specifies the dynamics of conflict and congruence among these values which were measured by his SVS test: benevolence (clearly identified in Confucianism), universalism (established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its subsequent treaties, covenants, and conventions) , self-direction (also proposed by the Kluckhohns and Strotdbeck considerations of values and value orientations and identifying all persons as independent individuals worthy of dignity and respect in the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights), stimulation and , hedonism (seen in Greek, Hindu, and Buddhism as potential contrasts to higher ideals) , achievement and power (relating to physical versus moral power as found among the Confuianists, Greeks, and early Christians, and recognizing social esteem and dignity for all individuals), security (seen in developing the social contract, popular sovereignty, and national sovereignty), conformity (seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its call for all states and individuals to adhere to its principles), and tradition (the development over time of perceived universal values, rights, and later human rights versus culturally, philosophically, or religiously different traditions).

Schwartz notes that: “The values theory describes aspects of the human psychological structure that are fundamental, aspects presumably common to all humankind. Consequently, its propositions should apply across cultures.” This statement certainly relates to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universal values as perceived historically.  There are four issues for consideration proposed by Schwartz: “(1) Is there a near universal set of values differentiated by motivational content? (2) Is the set of values identified by the theory comprehensive, leaving out none of the broad values to which individuals attribute at least  moderate importance?(3) Do the values have similar meanings in different groups (e.g. ethnic, national, gender, etc.) thereby justifying comparison of value priorities across groups? (4) Is there a near universal structure of dynamic relations among values? Though it is obvious that the governments from an Eastern, Middle Eastern, and African context might disagree sharply with me as they come from a particularistic and culturally diverse  framework for human rights and human values, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the subsequent treaties, covenants, and conventions demands a universalistic approach to human rights, and thus in my perception also to the even broader framework of universalistic human values (Prosser, 2012).

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Although complex in his theories, Jonathan Haidt makes every effort to make his book quite readable for the layperson, including those of us academics who are not embedded in the field of psychology. It is quite clear that he is very well read, as he says, not just in psychology, but in many other anthropological, historical, political science,  and sociological topics that help to inform us of his own understanding of moral psychology and the moral or righteous mind.

Haidt’s chapter summaries are exceedingly helpful for a fuller understanding of his metaphors ( which are mostly actually grammatically similies as he expresses them) and major arguments proposed in each of his chapters. The metaphors themselves (the soul of language as Kenneth Burke has proposed) provide the readers with common-sense analogies, in an otherwise fairly complex treatment of his topics related to moral psychology and the moral or righteous mind.

A minor note: while Haidt uses an older edition of the APA Manual for his references rather than the sixth edition, his citations are presented as end notes, rather than in the current APA Style Manual. American historians and political scientists appear to use the Chicago style, but I assumed that psychologists would use the current APA Style Manual for citations and references as many of us in the communication field do. For example, in the intercultural communication MA program at the Shanghai International Studies University, where I taught from 2005-2009, all of the students are required to have the most recent APA style (6^th edition) for all papers and MA theses (nearly 180 theses since the program  initiated this APA citation and reference style in 2005).

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